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DEL MONTE DUNES v. CITY OF MONTEREY: WILL 
THE SUPREME COURT STRETCH THE TAKINGS 
CLAUSE BEYOND THE BREAKING POINT? 
Philip Weinberg* 
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has restricted the ability 
of state and local governments to implement land use controls, 
wielding the Takings Clause of the Constitution as its weapon of 
choice. The Court has expanded the applicability of the doctrine 
far beyond claims concerning real property, to overturn legislation 
protecting employee health benefits, and to find unconstitutional 
programs providing legal services to low-income clients. This es-
say argues that this limiting of the government's ability to exer-
cise its police powers has subverted the original purpose of the 
Takings Clause. A case now pending before the Supreme Court, 
Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, could provide the opportu-
nity to reevaluate this course of action, or it could enable the 
Court to further restrict local governments from exercising intel-
ligent control of land uses. The author contends that the Court 
should restrict successful regulatory takings claims to those that 
meet already-established requirements of an actual physical occu-
pation or to those regulations that usurp all economic viability. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has launched an assault on state 
and local land use controls in recent years, using the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine of the Constitution as its battering ram. In 1998, the 
Court broadened its offensive, employing the Takings Clause to over-
turn legislation protecting employee health benefits and to undermine 
* Professor of Law, St. John University School of Law; Columbia Law School 1958. The author 
teaches Constitutional Law and Environmental Law and is author of a casebook, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Austin & Winfield, 2d ed. 1998), and several texts. He 
is indebted to Lisa Chun (St. John's Law School 2(00) for research assistance in preparing this 
article. 
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funds for legal services benefiting low and moderate-income clients. 
This unwarranted inflation of the venerable takings rules is a reprise 
of the Court's abuse of the Due Process Clause early in this century. 
Unless checked, it will lead to the same judicial strong-arming of 
legislation designed to curb economic abuses that damaged the Nation 
in past decades. As with the straining of due process to invalidate 
legislation regulating working conditions and prices, the current 
abuse of takings doctrine appears to be similarly driven by a deter-
mination to infuse the Constitution with economic doctrines that 
should be irrelevant to constitutional law. 
This essay will first examine the Supreme Court's two forays last 
year that expanded takings doctrine to challenge statutes outside the 
land use area in ways reminiscent of the Lochner era.1 It will then 
retrace the history of takings from its origins in land use regulation 
and roots in the power of eminent domain. This essay will end with 
an analysis of how the Court moved onto the wrong track and why it 
should apply the brakes. 
I. EASTERN ENTERPRISES: USING TAKINGS DOCTRINE AS A 
SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel2 was a challenge by a former coal 
producer to a federal statute aimed at ensuring employee benefits to 
miners. This provision, the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit 
Act of 19923 (the Coal Act), was the careful, balanced product of 
negotiation ending decades of unrest in the coal fields. The Court itself 
acknowledged that historically "medical facilities were frequently 
substandard" and "health care available to coal miners and their 
families was deficient in many respects."4 Health care became "a 
critical issue in collective bargaining," leading to the establishment of 
employer-financed benefit funds.6 
As coal, once a mainstay of the Nation's economy, became less 
so, and employment and profits dwindled, these benefit funds often 
cut back their payments. "Orphan retirees" from defunct operating 
companies were left without benefits in many cases.6 A commission 
appointed by Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole, after hearings, rec-
1 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
2 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). 
8 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1996). 
4 Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2137. 
SId. 
6Id. at 2140-41. 
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ommended federal legislation creating a fund. This recommendation 
resulted in the enactment of the 1992 Coal Act. The Coal Act merged 
employee benefit funds established in 1950 and 1974 through collec-
tive bargaining into a combined fund, financed by coal operators, to 
provide "substantially the same" benefits to retired miners and their 
dependents as the earlier plans furnished.7 Retirees were to be cov-
ered by the operators who employed them.8 
Eastern Enterprises (Eastern) contributed more than $60 million 
to the 1950 fund and an earlier one.9 In 1965 it sold its mines to a 
subsidiary, which ran them until 1987.10 Pursuant to the Coal Act, 
Eastern was held by the Commissioner of Social Security, who admin-
isters the Coal Act, to be responsible for the retired miners it had 
employed up to 1966. The company sued, objecting to its retroactive 
liability on both substantive due process grounds and as a taking.ll 
Eastern's claim was essentially that this liability should be borne by 
current coal operators, even though those companies had not em-
ployed Eastern's retired miners.12 Both lower courts rejected these 
claims,13 largely on the basis of the 1986 Supreme Court decision in 
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,t4 in which the justices 
had unanimously turned aside similar contentions. 
Connolly upheld the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA).16 That statute was enacted to curtail serious abuses of 
employees' pension funds. Amended in 1980, it established a govern-
ment-run fund, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, to payout 
benefits where pension plans had ended.16 Employers withdrawing 
from a multi-employer pension plan must pay their share of the plan's 
unfunded vested benefits, including those employers who withdrew 
within five months prior to enactment of the 1980 law.17 
Connolly sustained ERISA against a takings claim, just as an 
earlier decision had upheld it against a due process claim.18 These 
7 See 26 U.S.C. § 9703(b), (c), (t). 
8 See id. § 9704. 
B See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2143. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. at 2137, 2143. 
12 See id. at 2143. 
13 See id. 
14 475 U.S. 211 (1986). 
16 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1996); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 1018-19. 
18 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1311. 
17 See id. 
18 See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 
(1984). 
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cases accepted that "[i]n the course of regulating commercial and 
other human affairs, Congress routinely creates burdens for some 
that directly benefit others."19 Following settled law upholding eco-
nomic regulations of this nature since the 1930s as long as they have 
a rational basis,20 the Court in Connolly found "it would be surprising 
indeed to discover" a taking.21 The "assessment of withdrawal liabil-
ity," it continued, was "not made in a vacuum, ... but directly depends 
on the relationship between the employer and the plan to which it had 
made contributions."22 As the Court in Eastern acknowledged, "[t]he 
governmental action at issue in Connolly was not a physical inva-
sion of employers' assets; rather, it 'safeguard[ed] the participants in 
multi-employer pension plans by requiring a withdrawing employer 
to fund its share of the plan obligations incurred during its association 
with the plan."'23 
The Court likewise sustained the ERISA amendments as against 
due process and takings claims in 1993.24 But in Eastern, the Court 
changed its tack, finding the Coal Act provisions, in contrast to 
ERISA's, invalid.25 Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion concluded the 
Coal Act effected a taking.26 Justice Kennedy cast the fifth vote 
against the statute on substantive due process groundsP 
What was different enough about the Coal Act to cause the Court 
to declare it unconstitutional-as it did hand-springs to distinguish 
Connolly and the other recent decisions upholding similar provisions? 
Justice O'Connor first noted that the financial impact of the Coal Act 
on Eastern was between $50 and $100 million.28 However, under prior 
precedent, monetary burden ought not to be a factor unless the Coal 
Act, under basic principles, deprives the company of all reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.29 Eastern made no such showing. 
19 Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223. 
20 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
21 475 U.S. at 223. 
22 [d. at 225. 
23 Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (1998) (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225). 
24 See Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 
602 (1993). 
26 See 118 S. Ct. at 2149. 
26 See id. at 2137--53. 
27 See id. at 2154--60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
28 See id. at 2149. 
29 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,105 (1978). 
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Justice O'Connor pointed out that in Connolly and similar cases, the 
employers maintained a pension plan that later became subject to 
ERISA.30 But here, too, Eastern contributed to the pension funds in 
1947 and 1950 and continued mining until 1965, employing the retirees 
the Coal Act required it to protect.31 
The Court made much of the claim that the Coal Act "reaches back 
30 to 50 years to impose liability .... "32 Justice O'Connor went on to 
condemn retroactive laws out of hand, relying mainly on precedents 
from another era, such as an 1811 New York case and the 1891 edition 
of the Commentaries of Justice Story.33 These artifacts, some dating 
from the early nineteenth-century vested rights age and some from 
the Lochner era, are strange implements indeed for a modern court 
to use, as if it wrote its opinions with quill pens. Surely the modern 
view of retroactive statutes is to uphold their validity where that is 
the legislative intent.34 The sole vestige of the ancient taboo against 
retroactivity is the maxim that in divining legislative intent, retroac-
tivity is not to be inferred unless explicitly shown36-a far cry from 
finding it anathema. 
Ironically, Justice O'Connor sensibly rebuffed Eastern's substan-
tive due process argument, relying on six decades of decisions "aban-
don[ing] the use of the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to 
nullify laws which a majority of the Court believE e] economically 
unwise."36 Yet the plurality distorted takings jurisprudence to reach 
that exact result. Laws imposing economic burdens as severe as those 
in Eastern have consistently been sustained against takings claims.37 
In a further irony, Justice Kennedy's opinion concurring in the 
judgment rejected the takings rationale but, in contrast to Justice 
O'Connor's approach, found the Coal Act violative of the Due Process 
Clause.38 As he correctly noted, there can be no taking where the Act 
30 See Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2149. 
31 See id. at 2150. 
32 [d. at 2151. 
33 Seeid. (citing Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y. 1811»;2J. STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1398 (5th ed. 1891). 
34 See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 221, 223 (1986); Usery v. Thrner 
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976). 
35 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988). 
36 Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2153 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963». 
37 See id. at 2146-49 (citing Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers 
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 643-44 (1993); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223-24; Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731 (1984); Usery,428 U.S. at 18). 
38 See id. at 2154-60. 
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"does not appropriate, transfer, or encumber" property at all, but 
"simply imposes an obligation to perform an act, the payment of 
benefits."39 And the plurality's view would "subject . . . States and 
municipalities to the potential of new and unforeseen claims in vast 
amounts."40 Yet he concluded the Coal Act deprived Eastern of prop-
erty without due process, using reasoning discredited since the Court 
abandoned its pre-1930s view of due process as a juggernaut in the 
path of economic regulation.41 As with Justice O'Connor, it was 
retroactivity that he felt rendered the Act invalid, since ''the remedy 
created by the Coal Act bears no legitimate relation to the interest 
which the Government asserts in support of the statute."42 The prob-
lem was that "Eastern was once in the coal business and employed 
many of the beneficiaries, but it was not responsible for their expec-
tation of lifetime health benefits or for the perilous financial condition 
of the 1950 and 1974 Plans which put the benefits in jeopardy."43 In 
short, according to this view, Congress could not hold the employer 
to account for the benefits which its own retirees earned and ex-
pected. This flies in the face of Connolly and related decisions sus-
taining similar legislation, and of six decades of decisions holding 
"courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the 
judgment of legislative bodies .... "44 As Justice Kennedy himself had 
noted but a few years earlier, this expansive view of substantive due 
process "rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the 
capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels 
of human welfare."46 
As Justice Souter's dissent in Eastern points out, in the 1950s and 
1960s "there was an implicit understanding on both sides of the bar-
gaining table that the operators would provide the miners with life-
time health benefits" -an "understanding that kept the mines in op-
eration and enabled Eastern to earn handsome profits .... "46 All four 
dissenting justices agreed with Justice Kennedy that there was no 
89 [d. at 2154 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
40 [d. at 2155. 
41 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
42 Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
43 [d. 
44 Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730. 
45 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, 
JJ., concurring). 
46 118 S. Ct. at 2160 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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taking of property here.47 The Takings Clause-forbidding the gov-
ernmental taking of "private property ... for public use, without just 
compensation"48-"is designed not to limit the governmental interfer-
ence with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation 
in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a tak-
ing."49 According to this view, the real issue was whether the Coal Act 
deprived Eastern of property without due process. As to that, "the 
record demonstrates that Eastern, before 1965, contributed to the 
making of an important 'promise' to the miners," which, "even if not 
contractually enforceable, led the miners to 'develo[p]' a reasonable 
'expectation' that they would continue to receive '[retiree] medical 
benefits."'60 In short, in the four dissenters' view, the Coal Act was 
not "fundamentally unfair or unjust" since "Eastern cannot show a 
sufficiently reasonable expectation that it would remain free of future 
health care cost liability for the workers whom it employed."51 
II. PHILLIPS: TAKING PROPERTY THAT ISN'T PROPERTY 
Eastern showed four justices ready and willing to distort the ven-
erable takings doctrine, designed to safeguard property from govern-
ment confiscation, into a weapon to destroy an enactment to ensure 
health benefits-in the process beating a plowshare into a sword. In 
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,fIl. with the addition of Jus-
tice Kennedy, a majority of the Court actually showed its readiness 
to wield that sword against a target even further removed from the 
traditional subjects of takings decisions. 
Phillips was a challenge to Texas' Interest on Lawyers' Trust 
Account (IOLTA) program. IOLTA programs in 49 states make the 
interest earned by clients' funds held by lawyers available to finance 
legal services for low-income persons in need of representation. 53 The 
interest in question is earned on funds invested for such short periods 
that the bank's charges exceed the interest earned. The plaintiffs in 
Phillips, including a Texas attorney and client, contended the pro-
gram took clients' property-the interest-without just compensa-
47 See id. at 2161~. 
48 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
49 Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2163 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (emphasis omitted». 
60 Id. at 2165 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
51 [d. at 2168. 
62 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). 
63 See id. at 1927-28. The state without an IOLTA is Indiana. See id. at 1928, n.t. 
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tion.54 The Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, ruled the interest to 
be property within the meaning of the Takings Clause. Since the 
principal involved was concededly the client's property, the Court 
concluded the interest was as well, since under Texas law "interest 
follows principal."55 This was so even though Texas law does not 
adhere to the "interest follows principal" rule in income-only trusts 
and in distributing marital assets.56 The Court concluded the IOLTA 
interest was property even though it had previously rejected a tak-
ings claim in Andrus v. Allard by holding that "anticipated gains 
ha[ ve] traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other prop-
erty-related interests."67 
Andrus upheld a provision of the Eagle Protection Act that forbade 
the sale of eagle feathers, even those from birds lawfully killed before 
the Act took effect.58 The Court described "loss of future profits [as] 
a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim."69 That reed has 
somehow grown in two decades into a steel cable. 
The Court in Phillips remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to 
decide whether the Texas statute amounts to a taking of the inter-
est-already found by the Court to be property.60 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
dissented.61 (These were the same four justices who dissented in 
Eastern.) Justice Souter maintained that the interest cannot be con-
sidered the client's property since under Texas law it must be paid 
into the IOLTA fund.62 Whether something is "property" under the 
Constitution is a matter of state law, where the state is accused of 
depriving the owner ofit.63 Here, state law provides that the interest 
is not the client's property.64 Further, the property issue may not be 
divorced from the takings issue, for if "within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment, the IOLTA scheme had not taken the property recog-
nized today, or if it should turn out that the 'just compensation' for 
54 See id. at 1926. 
65 [d. at 1931--'J2. 
56 [d. at 1926-27. 
57 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
58 See 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1996); Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. 
59 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66. 
60 See 118 S. Ct. at 1934. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1971) (whether teacher's right to position 
is "property" is a question of state law). 
64 See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934. 
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any taking was zero, then there would be no practical consequence 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment in recognizing a client's prop-
erty right in the interest in the :first place . . . ."65 In this view, the 
takings issue is interwoven with the property issue, since the Takings 
Clause only requires just compensation for property taken, and none 
is likely to be owed. 
Justice Souter noted that the test to determine a taking is whether 
government has deprived the owner of all reasonable investment-
backed expectations or has physically seized tangible property.66 Nei-
ther occurred here. No property was seized in a physical sense, and 
there was no economic impact since the interest was by definition 
offset by the short duration of the account, the bank's service charges, 
or both.67 Only such accounts are covered by IOLTA in the :first place.68 
The interest is not considered income of the client by the Internal 
Revenue Service. And, as Justice Souter notes, the client could not 
earn any net interest even if IOLTA did not exist, so it is hard to see 
how a client is entitled to "just compensation"-the only relief avail-
able to remedy a taking.69 Unless, like Gogol's trickster Tchitchikov, 
one can profit by selling dead souls, there simply is no property to be 
taken here and therefore no taking. 
As Justice Breyer's dissent pointed out, the majority took the view 
that the value of what is taken is not what the owner actually lost but 
rather what he or she might in theory have gained.70 This would mean 
that if riparian rights were taken to build a dam, the owner must be 
paid not the value of the rights taken but "the value of the electricity 
that the dam would later produce"-a result at odds with every 
takings case on point.71 
Other courts that have examined this issue have taken the sensible 
approach of the Phillips dissenters. For instance, in Cone v. State Bar 
of Florida,72 the Eleventh Circuit held, as to an identical fund: 
[T]here was no taking of any property of the plaintiff. Standing 
alone, her deposit in the IOTA account could not earn anything. 
6& [d. at 1935 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
66 See id. at 1934--35; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 
(1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978). 
fI1 See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1934-36. 
68 See id. at 1929 (citing Texas IOLTA Rule 6). 
69 See id. at 1934-36. 
70 See id. at 1937. 
71 [d. at 1939 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
72 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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By combining all such deposits, interest income has been created 
which was not within the legitimate expectations of the owner of 
anyone of the principal amounts.73 
Yet the Phillips majority's conclusion that this phantom interest is 
the client's "property" steers the Court toward the far less convincing 
conclusion that the property has been "taken."74 Even if the interest 
is deemed property, a historically and analytically accurate look at the 
Takings Clause shows that the state has not ''taken'' such property in 
a constitutional sense. The client simply did not have any reasonable 
investment-backed expectation of receiving the interest. As discussed 
in the next section, this is borne out by an overview of the Supreme 
Court's decisions on takings for over a century. 
III. TAKINGS DECISIONS: EITHER PHYSICAL INVASION OR 
DEPRIVATION OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
The genesis of the takings doctrine is in the Fifth Amendment's 
requirement that private property be taken only "for public use" and 
for "just compensation,"76 applicable to state action through the Four-
teenth Amendment.76 As early as 1887 in Mugler v. Kansas,77 a brewer 
argued that his property had been taken in effect, if not in title, by a 
state law barring the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages. The 
Court, in an opinion penned by Justice Harlan, rebuffed the plaintiffs 
claim that an otherwise valid exercise of the state's police power had 
effectively taken his brewery.78 As the Court noted, the prohibition 
statute had made brewing an unlawful activity-tantamount to a 
public nuisance. Over three decades later, Justice Holmes, in the 
landmark Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,79 first used the takings 
73 [d. at 1007; see also Petition of Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 161, 158 (Minn. 1982) 
("There simply is no 'property' now in existence that would be taken."); Matter of Interest on 
Trust Accounts, 402 So.2d 389, 396 (Fla. 1981). 
74 See generally 118 S. Ct. 1926 (1998). 
75 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Beyond the scope of this essay lies the intriguing issue as to the 
extent to which a taking through eminent domain has been held to be for a public use. See 
generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1964) (taking of prospering retail store for urban 
renewal upheld as for public use); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (acquiring 
land by state to sell to resident tenants upheld as a public use); Poletown Neighborhood Council 
v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 465 (Mich. 1981) (city acquiring land to give to auto assembly 
plant upheld as a public use). 
76 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
77123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
78 See id. at 668-70. 
79 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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doctrine to overturn a state statute depriving the owner of under-
ground coal mining rights of all ability to use those rights. The statute, 
enacted to prevent the subsidence of surface land when coal was 
mined below, barred all mining by the owner of subsurface rights 
underneath a dwelling.so Justice Holmes relied heavily on the fact that 
the statute made it "commercially impracticable to mine," which ''has 
very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropri-
ating or destroying it."si But he aptly noted in oft-quoted dicta that 
"[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the generallaw."82 
From these principles-that a taking only occurs when all reason-
able value is removed-takings precedents followed. As early as Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., decided on the heels of Pennsyl-
vania Coal, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance though it assertedly 
deprived a developer of three-quarters of the value of its parcel.83 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian sustained a local law closing a brickyard in a 
residential district despite its removing seven-eighths of the value of 
the tract.84 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York86 Justice 
Brennan, writing for the Court, definitively spelled out the criteria 
for a taking through excessive regulation.86 Noting that no "set for-
mula" exists, he nonetheless examined the leading cases and found 
the test to be whether the regulation deprives the owner of all rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations. A mere reduction in the 
value of the land is plainly not sufficient to trigger a takings claim. 
The Court in Penn Central held the city's denial of permission to build 
an office tower atop New York's Grand Central Terminal, a historic 
landmark, was not a taking since it left the owner with the parcel 
intact, which was found to be capable of earning a reasonable return. 
Thus the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations were 
not destroyed.87 The Court went on to reject the owner's claims that 
80 See ill. at 412-13. 
81Id. at 414. 
82Id. at 413. 
83 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 384, 397 (1926). 
84 239 U.S. 394, 405, 414 (1915); Bee alBo Goldblatt v. Thwn of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 
(1962) (upholding zoning law prohibiting quarry). 
86 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
86 See ill. at 124. 
87 See ill. at 130. 
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its air rights had been taken and that the landmark law was uncon-
stitutional as spot zoning.88 
Likewise, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis89 used 
the same standard to sustain a state statute designed, like the one in 
Pennsylvania Coal, to prevent subsidence. The modern statute, how-
ever, allowed the subsurface owner to mine up to half the coal.90 
Therefore it did not deprive the owner of all investment-backed ex-
pectations. In addition, the Court in Keystone relied on the state's 
strong showing of need for the regulation based on safety-a showing 
that was absent in Pennsylvania Coal, which was a suit between the 
surface and subsurface owners, to which the state was not a party.91 
Thus a powerful series of precedents was built up over exactly a 
century, from Mugler to Keystone, in support of land use controls, 
even those significantly reducing the value of property, and rejecting 
takings claims as long as residual value remains with the owner. 
Recent state decisions have reflected these principles, and have prop-
erly relied on the owner's knowledge of the regulation at the time of 
the purchase. For example, in Gazza v. New York State Department 
of Environmental Conservation, a takings claim was denied by New 
York's Court of Appeals where the owner bought property that was 
subject to regulations controlling wetlands at the time he purchased 
the parcel. 92 
While this body of law developed, a parallel line of cases found 
takings where government had physically invaded an owner's prop-
erty. This sort of taking does not require the loss of all reasonable 
use. If property is physically invaded, government must pay for the 
proportion of the parcel it has seized. In United States v. Causby, 
overflights of military aircraft that reduced the value of a chicken 
farm constituted a taking by physical invasion, even though the farm 
could be used for other, less lucrative, purposes.93 The government 
was obliged to compensate the owner for the reduction in value 
caused by the overflights. Causby has been extended to holding mu-
nicipal airport operators liable for commercial aviation overflights94 
and to a local law requiring apartment-house owners to permit cable 
88 See id. at 132. 
89 480 u.s. 470 (1987). 
90 See id. at 470-72. 
91 See id. at 474. 
92 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1037~8 (N.Y. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 58 (1997). 
93 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). 
94 See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 92-93 (1962). 
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television operators to affix their equipment for only a nominal 
charge.96 
The courts show particular concern where the government regula-
tion interferes with an owner's right to exclude others. Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States set aside a condition attached to a United States 
Army Corps of Engineers permit authorizing the dredging of the 
mouth of a privately-owned lagoon in Hawaii.96 The agency insisted 
that the permit allow public access to the lagoon. The Court found the 
condition amounted to a taking, which enabled the public to navigate 
in the owner's previously-private waters. Similarly, New York's Court 
of Appeals ruled, relying in part on Kaiser Aetna, that a local law 
barring the demolition of single-room occupancy apartment buildings 
and requiring their owners to restore these apartments to habitable 
condition constituted a taking since it interfered so greatly with the 
"owners' fundamental rights to possess and to exclude .... "97 Judge 
Bellacosa presciently dissented, pointing out that "[e]ighty-five years 
after Lochner, we observe property rights, like the contract rights of 
that bygone era, being exalted over the Legislature's assessment of 
social policy"-a "policy choice [that] belongs to the elected officials 
who enacted the law."98 
Any doubt whether a regulatory taking was compensable ended in 
1987 when the United States Supreme Court in First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles held the Fifth 
Amendment requires payment of just compensation.99 This decision 
overruled state court rulings that a successful owner was only entitled 
to have the offending regulation set aside.1oo The view that regulatory 
takings should be compensable was the subject of intense criticism,lOl 
but is now accepted as gospel. The critics feared that requiring states 
and municipalities to pay for land use controls deemed unconstitu-
tional would inhibit them from adopting such regulations102-a fear 
unwarranted at the time and certainly not borne out by events since. 
95 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982). 
96 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). 
97 Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1065 (N.Y. 1989). 
98 [d. at 1072 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
99 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). 
100 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. 
City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976). 
101 See Norman Williams Jr. et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 
194, 240 (1984). 
102 See id. 
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In addition to decisions involving real property, the Supreme Court 
has examined regulations of personalty likewise challenged as tak-
ings. In Andrus v. Allard, as noted above, the Court upheld a statute 
that prohibited the selling of eagle feathers, including those from 
eagles taken before the statute was enacted. lOS Sustaining the law, the 
Court noted it did not deprive the owners of all reasonable use or 
economic expectations since they could continue to exhibit the feath-
ers for a fee. It based its ruling on decisions from the Prohibition era 
sustaining statutes that barred the sale of alcoholic beverages pur-
chased before those laws took effect. 1M 
Several years after Allard, however, in Hodel v. Irving, the Court 
found a taking where Congress provided that the shares of Native 
American tribe members holding less than a two percent interest in 
their tribe's property, or earning less than $100 per year for their 
owners, would escheat to the tribe.106 Although the Court (O'Connor, 
J.) found "dubious" the tribe members' investment-backed expecta-
tions, since the shares were nearly all acquired by descent, it none-
theless sensibly found a taking of the owners' interest since ''the 
character of the Government regulation here is extraordinary."l06 As 
with the denial of the ability to exclude others in Kaiser Aetna, ''the 
right to pass on property-to one's family in particular-has been 
part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times ... [and] 
a total abrogation of these rights cannot be upheld."l07 The Court 
distinguished Allard, in which the rights had not been extinguished, 
only limited. lOS 
Interestingly, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Powell, concurring, believed the case "indistinguishable" from 
Allard, and that "our decision effectively limits Allard to its facts."l09 
This plainly seems erroneous since, as the majority noted, this statute 
interfered with a basic attribute of property ownership-the right to 
devise it-and the one in Allard did not.110 But with Justice Scalia's 
103 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
104 See id. at 67 (citing Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924». 
106 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712-16 (1987). 
108 [d. at 715, 716. 
1111 [d. at 716, 717. 
1111 See id. at 717. 
109 [d. at 719 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices Stevens and White concurred on due process 
grounds. See id. at 734 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
llO See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 719. 
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concurrence in Hodel, we can discern the beginnings of the expansion 
of the takings doctrine that was to bear fruit in Eastern and Phillips. 
IV. NOLLAN, LUCAS AND DOLAN: HAS THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE 
EXPANDED? 
Three major Supreme Court decisions in the last twelve years have 
shown the Supreme Court's zeal to expand the takings doctrine. While 
all three reached appropriate results, language in these opinions 
might, unless limited by future decisions, open the takings door wider 
than the Framers of the Constitution intended. 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission found a taking where the 
state conditioned a permit to develop a shoreline lot on the owners 
allowing the public an easement across their beachfront.1l1 California 
considers its entire shore an environmentally critical area, and in 1976 
created a Coastal Commission with authority to regulate develop-
ment along its shorefront. The N ollans purchased property between 
two coastal state parks.l12 In order to implement the state's constitu-
tional provision ensuring public access to its coasts,113 the Commission 
conditioned the permit sought by the N ollans to build a residence on 
their allowance of an easement for the public to cross their beachfront 
in order to walk from one park to the other.114 
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, found a compen-
sable taking. Although the owners were plainly not deprived of all 
reasonable investment-based expectations, the state had imposed a 
condition that grossly interfered with their right to exclude others-
"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property."lt5 As the Court noted, had the 
state simply required the N ollans to furnish an easement, instead of 
making it a condition of the permit, the state would clearly have had 
to pay for it.lt6 Constitutionally, the situations were the same. 
The Commission could have imposed a height limit or similar re-
striction, or even prohibited building entirely, short of denying the 
Nollans all economically viable use. But, the Court stated that the 
"constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substi-
III 483 u.s. 825, 828, 838--39 (1987). 
112 See id. at 827. 
113 See CAL. CONBT. art. X, § 4. 
114 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. 
116 Id. at 831 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,176 (1979». 
116 See id. 
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tuted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as 
the justification for the prohibition."117 In other words, the state may 
not eliminate that "essential nexus" between its goal and the condition 
imposed. us In short, if the state "wants an easement across the N 01-
lans' property, it must pay for it."u9 
Nollan clearly turned on the physical invasion demanded by the 
Commission. It is perhaps arguable that the Court meant to inflate 
the newly-enunciated nexus requirement into a rule that would apply 
to all claimed takings. But this seems unlikely. The Court aptly relied 
on Loretto and Kaiser Aetna to find a taking based on the agency's 
order authorizing trespasses by outsiders onto the owners' prop-
erty.120 Conceivably a purely regulatory taking, without the invasive 
feature that permeated Nollan, might also lack the required nexus-
for example, a restriction on use utterly unconnected with the statu-
tory purpose. A zoning regulation might be construed to require all 
houses to be painted blue, for instance. But such a requirement would 
likely be set aside as irrational in any event. The Nollan nexus re-
quirement, to the extent that it adds an additional mandate for gov-
ernment, seems to apply only to regulations that cross the Rubicon 
and compel physical invasion. 
The Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council answered 
a question left open by earlier decisions: maya state justify a regula-
tory taking depriving the owner of all economic value by relying on 
the need to protect public safety?121 Actually, Pennsylvania Coal 
implicitly held it may not, finding a taking even though a law that 
removed all economic use was enacted to safeguard dwellings from 
subsidence if the coal below them was mined.l22 But that decision was 
made in 1922, in the infancy of land use regulation. Since then, an 
abundance of controls have been adopted, ranging from essentially 
esthetic requirements like historic landmark protection and boards of 
architectural review, to those mandated by health or safety. 
The statute in Lucas was in the latter camp.l23 It forbade construc-
tion of any permanent habitable structure on South Carolina's beach-
front areas, because of concerns over coastal erosion and flooding in 
117 [d. at 837. 
118 [d. 
119 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842. 
120 See id. at 831---32. 
121 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-26 (1992). 
122 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
123 See 505 U.S. at 1021-22. 
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that hurricane-prone venue. Lucas, who purchased two beachfront 
parcels two years before the statute was enacted, contended the 
state's denial of permission to build on those lots deprived him of all 
reasonable investment-backed expectations and thus constituted a 
taking. The trial court so found.124 However, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court ruled that although the act denied the owner all reason-
able economic value it was nonetheless not a taking since it consti-
tuted a use of the state's police power "to enjoin a property owner 
from activities akin to public nuisances."l26 The United States Su-
preme Court thus had to determine whether a valid distinction ex-
isted between laws to protect esthetic values as in Penn Central or 
socially desirable public access as in Nollan and those aimed at curb-
ing "harmful or noxious uses."126 
The Court ruled that in the uncommon case of a regulation actually 
depriving the owner of all reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions, the governmental entity must compensate the owner for the 
taking unless the limit on development "inhere[s] in the title itself, in 
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of prop-
erty and nuisance already place upon land ownership."l27 In such a 
case, where the state could have enjoined the use under common-law 
principles, the owner takes subject to that restriction and is not 
entitled to compensation. In all other situations, though, a regulation 
denying all reasonable economic value constitutes a taking whether 
enacted to provide a public benefit or to curb a noxious or harmful 
use. As the Court noted, these are simply two ways of describing the 
police power-in effect, two sides of the same coin.l28 
On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court predictably, and 
properly, ruled that common-law doctrine could not have barred all 
development of Lucas's shorefront lots. He recovered the full market 
value of the parcels.l29 
Lucas eminently makes sense. An alternative ruling would compel 
the courts to engage in hair-splitting distinctions between legislation 
aimed at furnishing benefits and laws designed to prevent harms. 
Further, this would merely encourage states and localities to employ 
124 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991) (recounting 
trial court award to Lucas of $1,232,387.50 as just compensation for the regulatory taking). 
126 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022. 
126 [d. at 1004. 
127 [d. 
128 See itt. at 1022-26. 
129 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992). 
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semantics to shoehorn regulations into the latter category-avoiding 
the harm of destroying a historic landmark, for example, instead of 
providing the benefit of safeguarding its existence. Where a property 
owner's total economic value is obliterated, it matters little whether 
the state was fostering a public good or averting public harm. 
The most recent in the trio of takings decisions regarding land use 
controls, Dolan v. City o/Tigard,130 like Nollan, dealt with a physical 
invasion-this time in the context of a mandated dedication of a strip 
of land. As a condition of a permit sought by the landowner to increase 
the size of her hardware store, the city's planning commission re-
quired that she dedicate about a tenth of her parcel for flood drainage 
and a path for pedestrians and bicyclists.13l This directive, like the 
condition attached to the permit in Nollan, compelled the owner to 
open up a portion of her property to the public. The Court annulled 
the required dedication as not roughly proportionate to the city's twin 
goals of avoiding construction in the flood plain and encouraging the 
use of bicycling as an alternative to automobile traffic. But it empha-
sized "the loss of her ability to exclude others."l32 As in Nollan, the 
Court characterized that ability as "one of the most essential sticks in 
the bundle of rights" called property.133 The city plainly could have 
achieved its flood-control goal by simply restricting construction in 
the flood plain area of the Dolan parcel. As for reducing traffic, the 
city's finding that a bikeway "could offset some of the traffic demand" 
was surely insufficient to warrant requiring the owner to allow 
strangers to traverse her property.134 As with Nollan, if the city 
wanted an easement it should pay for it. 
Nollan and Dolan are certainly correct if limited to mandated ease-
ments or similar dedications. Though each decision contains broad 
language as to the required nexus and rough proportionality, the 
courts should resist the temptation to apply those doctrines to con-
ventional land use regulation-cases without the oppressive public 
easements required in those situations. Only in the most extraordi-
nary cases should a land use control that does not amount to a physical 
invasion be set aside as not linked to the governmental goal, or grossly 
disproportionate to it. In those unusual situations the time-honored 
130 512 u.s. 374 (1994). 
131 See id. at 377. 
132 [d. at 393. 
133 [d. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979». 
134 [d. at 395. 
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requirement that a land use regulation must have a rational basis, 
that it "substantially advance legitimate state interests,"l36 should 
suffice to overturn controls that lack that basis. 
v. DEL MONTE DUNES: TIME TO LIMIT THE INFLATION OF TAKING 
A suit now before the United States Supreme Court, Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey,t36 furnishes an opportu-
nity for the Court to curb its expansion of takings doctrine, and to 
clarify some issues of procedure and proof. If wrongly decided, Del 
Monte Dunes could wreak havoc with state and local land use regu-
lation. 
The city denied a permit to build a large residential complex on a 
shorefront site, because of the proposed development's impact on the 
habitat of an endangered species of butterfly and the city's concern 
over public access to the coast, as in Nollan.137 The state later pur-
chased the parcel for $800,000 more than the developer had paid for 
it in 1984.138 The developer nonetheless sued in federal court, asserting 
a taking as well as due process and equal protection violations.139 Since 
the action . was brought under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the plaintiff sought a jury trial.140 
The jury awarded damages on the taking and equal protection 
claims. The district judge dismissed the due process claim.141 The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed,l42 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Since the court below upheld the propriety of a jury trial, sustained 
the jury verdict as ''reasonable,'' and applied the "rough proportion-
ality" standard of Dolan to a land use regulation that did not compel 
a dedication or comparable physical invasion, the Court has before it 
a trio of issues capable of dangerously inhibiting zoning and environ-
mental land use controls.l43 The jury issue is, however, less likely to 
recur since takings claims against state and local regulations are not 
136 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978), quoted in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023 (1992). 
186 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996), em. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1359 (1998). 
137 See id. at 1425. 
138 See id. at 1432. 
189 See id. at 1425. 
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1425-27. 
141 See Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1425. 
142 See generally id. 
143 [d. at 1429-30. 
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normally brought in federal court, and states generally do not provide 
jury trials in takings cases.144 
There is no basis in either history or legal principle for jury trials 
of taking claims. Under the Seventh Amendment, preserving the 
right of jury trial in "[s]uits at common law" in the federal courts, 
parties are entitled to a jury if "the right . . . existed under the 
English common law when the [a]mendment was adopted" in 1791.145 
This is determined with respect to the particular cause of action, or, 
if it did not then exist, an "appropriate analog[y]."146 At common law, 
juries never decided whether a taking by eminent domain was neces-
sary for a public use, as mandated by the Fifth Amendment.147 This 
was so because condemnation was a special proceeding, not an action 
at common law.148 In contrast, the issue of just compensation was, and 
is, triable by a jury.149 
Since the time a taking, or inverse condemnation, has existed as a 
claim, its propriety has been decided by courts, not juries. No jury 
was employed in Penn Central, Lucas, Loretto, Goldblatt, Nollan, 
Agins, Dolan, Eastern, or Phillips. This is so because in the end, 
takings doctrine is an offshoot of eminent domain-not a determina-
tion of just compensation. 
Of even greater concern is the mischief that would result from jury 
determinations as to whether a taking occurred. Jury verdicts are apt 
to vary greatly, depending on subjective factors. In short, they lack 
the uniformity of judicial decisions. This may not much matter in 
personal injury cases, but takings claims typically involve land use 
regulations that apply to numerous parcels. Inconsistent judgments 
as to whether these controls amount to compensable takings will 
create enormous legal, political and economic problems. Municipalities 
may have to pay the owner of one parcel, but not another who is 
identically situated. 
Worse yet, the Ninth Circuit felt obliged to uphold the jury's ver-
dict as long as it was "reasonable."150 This does violence to the rule 
144 Del Monte Dunes was brought in federal court because when the suit was instituted in 
1986, California's courts did not provide a forum to recover damages in takings cases. See First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318-20 (1987) (instituting 
availability of damages). 
145 Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656-57 (1935). 
146 'full v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987). 
147 See United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1970). 
148 See Bouton v. Potomac Edison Co., 418 A.2d 1168, 1170 (Md. 1980). 
149 See Reynolds, 397 U.S. at 19. 
150 Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1430 (9th Cir. 1996), 
em. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1359 (1998). 
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that land use regulations should be sustained as long as they have 
a rational basis and do not deny all reasonable economic value. And 
finally, the court applied the "rough proportionality" test of Dolan 
where no dedication, physical invasion or similar exaction by govern-
ment was compelled. The rough proportionality test, newly pro-
claimed in Dolan, has no applicability to a claim that a land use 
regulation deprives the owner of all economic value. It was not em-
ployed in Penn Central, Keystone or Lucas and should not be in Del 
Monte Dunes, where the owner voiced identical contentions to the 
ones in those cases.161 The Court in Dolan explicitly distinguished that 
case from its predecessors since in Dolan "the conditions imposed 
were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make of her 
own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property 
to the city,"I62 tantamount to the easement demanded in Nollan. 
Del Monte Dunes offers the means for the Court to limit Nollan 
and Dolan to interference with an owner's right to exclude strang-
ers-the essence of property ownership.l63 Conversely, should the 
Court affirm the Ninth Circuit Del Monte Dunes decision, it will 
overturn decades of takings decisions and severely subvert the ability 
of state and local governments to intelligently control land use. With 
enlightened planning and zoning to reduce sprawl, safeguard neigh-
borhoods and respect environmental and historic concerns ever more 
essential, affirmation of the odd and mischievous Del Monte Dunes 
holding would be a major step backward. 
VI. HAVE THE COURTS SUBVERTED THE TAKINGS CLAUSE'S 
INTENT? 
Since Pennsylvania Coal in 1922, the courts have taken for granted 
that when government "goes too far" in regulating property,l64 a 
taking has occurred. But, as Professor William Treanor has persua-
sively shown, the Takings Clause was intended to deal with actual 
takings by eminent domain, and not with regulations of property at 
all. l66 James Madison's statements at the Constitutional Convention, 
as described by Treanor, ''uniformly indicate that the clause only 
mandated compensation when the government physically took prop-
151 See id. at 1425. 
152 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). 
153 See Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1422. 
154 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
155 See generally William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and 
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). 
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erty."l56 Prior to the Constitution's passage, both the Crown and the 
states had seized private property voraciously and often without 
scruples as to its public use or the need to pay just compensation. 
The only significant nineteenth century Supreme Court decision 
finding a violation of the Takings Clause, Pumpelly v. Green Bay 
CO.,t57 involved a physical invasion of property caused by the flooding 
of the plaintiff's land pursuant to a state statute. Mugler, discussed 
earlier, specifically rebuffed a takings claim by a brewer who claimed 
a state prohibition law rendered his property worthless.l68 According 
to Treanor, Pennsylvania Coal, largely recognized as the source of 
the takings doctrine, derived from Justice Holmes' view that "[s]ome 
small limitations of previously existing rights incident to property 
may be imposed for the sake of preventing manifest evil; large ones 
could not be, except by the exercise of the right of eminent domain."l69 
It is too late to seriously argue that the Takings Clause ought to be 
restricted to physical invasions and direct exercises of eminent do-
main. But surely its original intent should be a weighty element in 
determining whether it should be further expanded. Just as the Court 
cabined substantive due process challenges to property rights half a 
century ago, it is time for it to halt the inflation of takings doctrine as 
a latter-day equivalent. 
CONCLUSION 
The courts should strike an appropriate balance between owners' 
property rights and the responsibility of the state and local govern-
ments to control land use in order to avoid sprawl and safeguard 
water supply, wetlands and historic landmarks. Expanding the appli-
cation of the Takings Clause to allow it to swallow legitimate uses of 
the police power-and notably, wielding the Clause against statutes 
like those in Eastern Enterprises and Phillips that do not involve real 
property at all-stretches far beyond any reasonable balance. It does 
violence to the intent of the Takings Clause and ignores decades of 
decisions consistently sustaining economic regulations as long as they 
have a rational basis. 
While the Takings Clause should not "be relegated to the status of 
a poor relation,"l60 it likewise should not be the autocrat of the break-
166 [d. at 791. 
167 80 U.S. 166, 167 (1872). 
168 See 123 U.S. 623, 635 (1887). 
169 Treanor, supra note 155, at 799 (quoting Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (Mass. 1889». 
160 Dolan v. City of TIgard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994). 
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fast table. Nearly a century ago Justice Holmes warned us that the 
"[C]onstitution is not intended to embody a particular economic the-
ory, whether of paternalism ... or of laissez faire."161 He added that 
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's 
Social Statics."l62 Nor did it enact Judge Richard Posner's law and 
economics. 
161 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
162 Id. 
